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Abstract
Cooperation is prevalent in nature, not only in the context of social interactions within
the animal kingdom, but also on the cellular level. In cancer for example, tumour cells can
cooperate by producing growth factors. The evolution of cooperation has traditionally been
studied for well-mixed populations under the framework of evolutionary game theory, and
more recently for structured populations using evolutionary graph theory. The population
structures arising due to cellular arrangement in tissues however are dynamic and thus cannot
be accurately represented by either of these frameworks. In this work we compare the
conditions for cooperative success in an epithelium modelled using evolutionary graph theory,
to those in a mechanical model of an epithelium- the Voronoi tessellation model. Crucially,
in this latter model cells are able to move, and birth and death are not spatially coupled. We
calculate fixation probabilities in the Voronoi tessellation model through simulation and an
approximate analytic technique and show that this leads to stronger promotion of cooperation
in comparison with the evolutionary graph theory model.
Keywords— cooperation, epithelium, population structure, evolutionary graph theory, Voronoi
tessellation
1 Introduction
Tumour development is an evolutionary process whereby cells undergo a series of genetic changes
leading to acquired capabilities that confer some growth advantage. In Hanahan and Weinberg’s
seminal paper [1], six such capabilities or ‘hallmarks of cancer’ were identified to be necessary for
normal cells to become malignant: self-sufficiency in growth signals, insensitivity to antigrowth
signals, evading apoptosis, limitless replicative potential, sustained angiogenesis, and tissue in-
vasion and metastasis. Many of these rely on the production of diffusible growth factors [2], the
effects of which are felt not only by the producer cell but by other cells in the neighbourhood.
As such production of these growth factors can be considered an example of cellular cooperation
[3, 4].
The reprogramming of energy metabolism is also considered to be a hallmark of cancer [5]
and refers to the fact that cancer cells tend to metabolise through glycolysis rather than aerobic
respiration, even when oxygen is abundant. This is known as the Warburg effect [6]. It has been
postulated that glycolytic cells can be considered as cooperators, in that they produce lactic acid
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as a by-product which is toxic to healthy cells, and can thus be considered a shared benefit to
the cancer cells.
Models of the evolution of cooperation for diffusible growth factors [7–9] and the Warburg
effect [10–12] have been developed using the framework of evolutionary game theory for well-
mixed populations. These models have also been extended to consider spatial effects by placing
cells on a lattice [14? , 15] or a fixed graph [16, 17]. Further examples of the application of
game theory to cancer evolution include microenvironment dependency [18, 19], environmental
poisoning [20] and invasion [21]. See [22] for a recent review of evolutionary game theory applied
to somatic evolution.
Cell populations are not well-mixed but organised into tissues or tumours, thus the recent
move to incorporate spatial structure is important. Introducing population structure can have
a significant effect on evolutionary dynamics [23], in particular in promoting cooperation [24].
The established framework for modelling games on structured populations, used in the models
mentioned above, is evolutionary graph theory (EGT) [25–31] in which individual cells are placed
on the vertices of a graph and neighbours are joined together by edges. Individuals interact and
play games with their neighbours, thus deriving their fitnesses. The population evolves via
some update rule which dictates how birth and death occur while maintaining the fixed graph
structure. When a cell divides it is necessary for a neighbouring cell to die in order that one of
the offspring can occupy the empty vertex. Two commonly used update rules are the birth-death
and death-birth rules which essentially differ in the order in which birth and death events occur.
There are several shortcomings of evolutionary graph theory in application to somatic evolu-
tion. Tissue and tumour structures are not fixed but dynamic, due to processes of cell division,
extrusion and motility. Furthermore the necessity of births and deaths occurring next to each
other is not only unrealistic, but the choice of update rule is one of the main determinants of
evolutionary outcomes [32]. Recent work has introduced a new ‘shift update’ with the aim of
addressing the unsuitability of the traditional update rules for cellular structures. The model
works extremely well in one-dimension [33], predicting enhanced cooperative success compared to
other update rules. However the extension into two-dimensions [34] is not straightforward as the
shifting of cells disrupts cluster formation of cooperators. This can be resolved by introducing a
repulsive force between cells of different types and choosing energy-minimising shift paths. If the
force is strong enough the shift dynamics is again an effective promoter of cooperation. However
it relies on this somewhat artificial preferential sorting.
Dynamic graph models of evolutionary games also exist, however they focus on switching con-
nections between vertices, either at random or to increase fitness [35–38]. These types of models
are relevant in social networks, for example, where agents can choose who they interact with and
can break social ties with individuals who do not cooperate [39]. They are not good models,
however, for populations of cells which are spatially constrained in two- or three-dimensional
structures. Furthermore they still require birth and death to be coupled.
In order to elucidate what impact, if any, the dynamic nature of cell populations and spatial
decoupling of birth and death has on the evolution of cooperation, we will consider evolutionary
games on a mechanical model of an epithelium- the Voronoi tessellation (VT) model [40, 41].
Epithelia are the tissues which form the surfaces in the body, such as skin, and the linings of
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organs. We choose this particular tissue structure as it can be modelled in two dimensions as
a sheet of polygonal cells [42]. Furthermore epithelial cells are highly proliferative compared to
other cell types and the source of 85% of cancers making them of particular interest in models
of cancer evolution.
Rather than focussing on a particular cancer model, we consider the simple, and well studied,
example of an additive prisoner’s dilemma game, whereby cooperators pay a cost c in order to
produce some benefit b for their neighbours. We consider whether the results for the VT model
are significantly different from those obtained from EGT. In particular we calculate the fixation
probabilities for single mutant cooperators arising in a population of defectors in both models.
We begin, in Section 2, by introducing EGT and looking at how it can be applied to the
evolution of cooperation on epithelia, considering results for an additive prisoner’s dilemma
game with both birth-death and death-birth update rules. We then, in Section 3, introduce the
VT model of an epithelium, again considering the evolution of cooperation under a prisoner’s
dilemma, but this time with spatially decoupled birth and death. We calculate approximate
fixation probabilities as well as looking at simulation results. Finally in Section 4 we compare
these results with the EGT model, finding that cooperation is significantly more successful in
the VT model. By running further simulations, implementing an explicit death-birth update in
the VT model and a migration analogue into the EGT model, we identify the decoupling of birth
and death to be the primary mechanism for the discrepancy.
2 Evolutionary graph theory
2.1 The model
Evolutionary graph theory provides a framework for modelling the evolution of traits on fixed
population structures represented by a static graph G. Individuals, labelled i = 1, 2, ..., N for
a population size N , are represented by the vertices, while the edges correspond to neighbour
connections. We therefore define the adjacency matrix
Aij =
1, if i and j are neighbours0, otherwise. (1)
In the additive prisoner’s dilemma, the trait or type of an individual i is given by si ∈ {0, 1},
with si = 0 denoting a defector (D) and si = 1 a cooperator (C). The state of the population is
then given by the N -dimensional vector s.
For a population in state s, individual i obtains a payoff fi(s) from its neighbours which is
calculated according to a payoff matrix, given by
C D( )
C b− c −c
D b 0
, (2)
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where b > c and c > 0. The payoffs are thus
fi(s) = −csi + b
∑
j∈G
Aijsj
ki
, (3)
where ki =
∑
j∈GAij is the degree of vertex i (i.e. the neighbour number). Fitness is then defined
to be
Fi(s) = 1 + δfi(s) , (4)
where δ > 0 is the selection strength parameter and the constant 1 takes into account other
contributions to fitness. We can let c = 1 without loss of generality, thus the game is defined by
a single parameter.
Evolution proceeds via a spatial extension of the Moran process [25, 43] whereby, at each time
step, an individual dies and another reproduces. The offspring occupies the vacant vertex thus
keeping the graph structure constant. There are several potential mechanisms for this, known
as update rules. Here we consider two common rules:
• birth-death: an individual is chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to fitness;
its offspring takes the site of a neighbour selected uniformly at random to die;
• death-birth: an individual is chosen to die uniformly at random; it is replaced by the
offspring of a neighbour chosen with probability proportional to fitness.
For a well-mixed population, represented by a complete graph, these two updates rules are
equivalent, however for an arbitrary population structure the choice of update rule leads to
strikingly different dynamics. In the following we will consider the dynamics in both cases for
graph structures representing an epithelium.
2.2 Fixation probabilities
In order to consider game dynamics on an epithelium within the EGT context we consider two
different graph structures. Epithelial cells have six neighbours on average, therefore a hexagonal
lattice (HL) is a simple approximation. A Voronoi tessellation however gives a more realistic
representation of an epithelium [44–46]. There is some variance in neighbour number, but the
mean is still 6. The Delaunay triangulation (DT) corresponding to a VT gives the appropriate
graph connecting neighbouring cells. See Section 3.1 and Figure 2 for more detail on these terms.
We measure the success of a cooperative mutant by comparing its fixation probability (ρC) to
that of a neutral mutant (ρ0 = 1/N). Thus if ρC > 1/N we say that cooperation is a beneficial
mutation or that it is ‘favoured by selection’. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio, denoted (b/c)∗,
is the point where the cooperator fixation probability is equal to the neutral fixation probability,
i.e. ρC = 1/N .
For a death-birth update rule we calculate the fixation probabilities against benefit-to-cost
ratio (b/c) for an HL and DT with a population size ofN = 100 and periodic boundary conditions.
Results are plotted in Figure 1 in which each data point is the result of 1×105 simulations.
Analytical results are calculated using the theory developed in [31], where the authors derive an
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equation
ρC =
1
N
+
δ
2N
(−ct2 + b(t3 − t1)) +O(δ2) (5)
for the fixation probabilities on any graph. Here tn is the expected coalescence time from the two
ends of an n-step random walk, where the initial vertex is chosen proportional to degree. Thus
these quantities are purely properties of the graph and can be calculated computationally by
solving a recurrence relation. We use a small selection strength, δ = 0.025, and there is a good
fit between simulation and theory in the range shown for b > 4. Furthermore the heterogeneity
in the DT seems to have a negligible effect on fixation probabilities compared to the dependence
on benefit-to-cost ratio. These are calculated for both graphs from simulations and Equation (5)
and summarised in Table 1.
Theory Simulation
EGT model with DT (death-birth) 6.69 6.74
EGT model with HL (death-birth) 6.68 6.67
VT model (decoupled update) 2.78 2.83
VT model (death-birth) - 7.26
Table 1: Summary of critical benefit-to-cost ratios, (b/c)∗, for the different models: a Moran pro-
cess with death-birth update on a Voronoi network and a hexagonal lattice; a Voronoi tessellation
model. Results are shown for both the theory and simulations.
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Figure 1: Fixation probabilities for a prisoner’s dilemma game in the EGT model with c = 1 and
δ = 0.025. Solid lines plot theoretical fixation probabilities for a single cooperator on a hexagonal
lattice (HL, green) and a Delaunay triangulation (DT, blue), obtained from Equation (5). The
critical benefit-to cost ratio, which occurs where fixation probability is equal to ρ0 = 1/N (grey),
is (b/c)∗ ≈ 6.7 for the HL and DT. Simulation results are also shown for both cases and fit well
with the theoretical fixation probabilites when (b/c) > 4. However, as Equation (5) was derived
in the weak selection limit we only expect it to be accurate near the critical ratio.
The results are very different for a birth-death update rule: cooperation is never favoured
by selection under an additive prisoner’s dilemma game and ρC < 1/N for all b < c, c > 0
[26, 29, 32]. Thus within the EGT framework cooperation is only a successful evolutionary
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strategy on an epithelial structure with a death-birth update above a critical benefit-to-cost
ratio of approximately 6.7.
The HL seems to be a reasonable approximation to the structure. Using the more realistic
DT with neighbour number heterogeneity does not significantly alter fixation probabilities or the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio, at least in the weak selection limit we are using. We note however
that these results are for an average payoff and that an accumulative payoff (in which payoffs
are simply summed over interactions) can amplify differences due to heterogeneity. We should
also note that cooperation is possible in well-mixed populations or graph structured populations
with birth-death update for games other than the prisoner’s dilemma, such as the snowdrift or
stag-hunt games, and it is possible to generalise (5) to analyse these [31].
Whether or not these results are illuminating in terms of a real epithelium is an important
question however, and as we have noted previously there are some serious shortcomings to the
model, first that population structure is static and secondly the troubling dependence on the
update rule. Which update rule is closest to reality is unclear and while there likely is some cou-
pling in birth and death processes in a real epithelium, there is certainly no absolute requirement
for birth and death events to occur next to each other. In order to explore whether these factors
are important to the dynamics we will move on to consider the VT model of an epithelium in
which cells are able to move past each other and birth and death are spatially decoupled.
3 Voronoi tessellation model of an epithelium
In order to analyse the dynamics of evolutionary games on a more realistic population structure
we will use the VT model [40, 41] developed for the colonic crypt epithelium. In the following we
will explain how the mechanical model works and generates a time-dependent graph structure
on which to study evolutionary game dynamics. We will then derive an approximation for the
fixation probability and use these results along with simulation to compare with the EGT model.
3.1 The model
The VT model represents a tissue as a set of points corresponding to the centres of individual
cells. These points lie in a fixed domain with periodic boundary conditions. Cells move freely in
space and exert spring-like forces on one another, such that
Fij(t) = µrˆij(t)(|rij(t)| − sij(t)) (6)
is the force exerted by cell j on its neighbour i. Here µ is the spring constant and rij = ri − rj ,
where ri is the position vector of cell i and rˆij is the corresponding unit vector. The natural
seperation between cells sij(t) = s is constant and the same for all neighbour pairs. The exception
to this is for newborn sister cells for whom sij grows linearly from  to s over the course of an
hour.
The total force acting on cell i is then
Fi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni(t)
Fij , (7)
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Figure 2: Voronoi tessellation (VT, black) and Delaunay triangulation (DT, red) of a set of
points representing cell-centres. The VT divides the plane into polygons such that every point in
a polygon is closer to its corresponding cell-centre than any other. The DT partitions the plane
into triangles and is the dual graph to the VT. Spring forces act along the lines of the DT
where Ni(t) is the set of cells neighbouring i. By assuming that motion is over-damped due to
high levels of friction we obtain the equation of motion for each cell in the form of a first order
differential equation
η
dri
dt
= Fi(t) , (8)
where η is the damping constant. This is solved numerically using
ri(t+ ∆t) = ri(t) +
∆t
η
Fi , (9)
where ∆t is a sufficiently small time step for numerical stability. For the parameter values used
in our simulations see Table 2.
Parameter Description Value
µ Spring constant 50.0
s Natural seperation of mature cells 1.0
 Initial seperation of sister cells 0.05
η Drag coefficient 1.0
∆t Time step (h) 0.005
λ Division and apoptosis rate (h−1) 12.0−1
Table 2: Table of parameters used in the Voronoi tessellation model [42].
The neighbour connections between cells are determined by the VT of the set of cell-centres
(see Figure 2). The VT divides the plane into polygons, where each polygon is defined as the the
region of the plane closer to its generator (i.e. cell-centre) than any other. Each cell can therefore
be represented as a distinct region with a well-defined area and neighbour set. The dual graph to
the VT is the Delaunay triangulation (DT) in which the cell centres are the graph vertices and
neighbours are connected by edges. The DT therefore gives the adjacency matrix Aij(t) from
which we can calculate cell fitnesses. As it is defined by the cell-centre positions, the DT must
be recalculated after every timestep during which cells may have moved, died or reproduced.
As in the previous model we allow the system to evolve by a Moran process whereby birth
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Figure 3: Spatially decoupled update rule in the Voronoi tessellation model. When an update
event occurs a mother cell is chosen to reproduce with probability proportional to fitness (blue).
A second cell is chosen to die uniformly at random (red). The mother cell divides and the dead
cell is removed from the tissue.
and death events occur simultaneously. The key difference is that we decouple the locations of
these events. We also implement the process in continuous rather than discrete time, noting that
a translation to continuous time in the previous model does not affect fixation probabilities [31]
and therefore the results are directly comparable. In the continuous time Moran process update
events occur at exponentially distributed times with rate λ. When an update event occurs a
mother cell is chosen at random from the population with probability proportional to fitness.
This cell divides creating two daughter cells, which are exact clones of the mother. A cell is
also chosen to die (i.e. to be extruded from the tissue) uniformly at random. This process is
represented in Figure 3.
To calculate fixation probabilities for a single mutant cooperator invading a defector pop-
ulation in the VT model we run simulations as follows. We begin with defector cells placed
on a regular hexagonal lattice with periodic boundary conditions and the simulation algorithm
proceeds until the system has relaxed into a dynamic equilibrium. We then choose a random cell
to become a cooperator and continue the simulation until only cooperators or defectors remain.
The simulation algorithm consists of the following steps: (1) DT is performed to determine cell
neighbours; (2) forces are calculated and the cells moved accordingly; (3) an update event occurs
with probability Nλ∆t, in which case fitnesses are calculated according to the evolutionary game
and the decoupled update rule is applied.
3.2 Approximating the fixation probabilities
Due to the complexities of the VT model it is not possible to derive exact analytical solutions as
was done for EGT [31]. Instead we look for approximate solutions by considering the expected
fitness for different cell types in populations with a given number of cooperators [47]. While
the graph is dynamic and dependent on the spatial distribution of points, it is also planar and
mechanically constrained. Furthermore if we begin with a single mutated cell, its progeny are
likely to remain in a cluster as the clone grows. Thus we assume that variation in fitnesses for
cells of each type will be small for a given number of cooperators in the population and that
the average over a large number of states is a good approximation. Comparing our theoretical
results to simulations we find that fixation probabilities calculated based on this assumption are
good approximations.
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Let us denote a state with n cooperators Sn = (sn, G), where sn is the vector of cell types
and G is the graph. Then we define T+/−(Sn) to be the probability that when an event occurs
the number of cooperators is increased/decreased by one, i.e
T+(Sn) =
(
1− n
N
) ∑
i∈G siFi∑
i∈G Fi
(10)
T−(Sn) =
n
N
(
1−
∑
i∈G siFi∑
i∈G Fi
)
. (11)
We can then define the average transition probabilities for a state with n cooperators to be
T±n = 〈T±(Sn)〉 where the average is taken over a large ensemble of possible states. Substituting
in for the fitnesses (4) and taking the weak selection limit δ  1 we obtain
T+n =
n
N
N − n
N
(1 + δ〈fC − f〉0) +O(δ2) (12)
T−n =
n
N
N − n
N
(
1− n
n−N δ〈fC − f〉0
)
+O(δ2) , (13)
where 〈.〉0 denotes an average over a large ensemble of possible states for the neutral process
δ = 0 and
fC =
1
n
∑
i∈G
sifi f =
1
N
∑
i∈G
fi (14)
are the average cooperator fitness and average fitness respectively. From (3) and (14) we obtain
〈fC − f〉0 = −c
(
1− n
N
)
+ b
(
ΛCCn −
n
N
)
, (15)
where
ΛCCn =
1
n
〈∑
i,j∈G
sisjAij
ki
〉
0
(16)
is the normalised average number of degree-weighted cooperator-cooperator interactions in a
system with n cooperators. This can be calculated computationally by running simulations for
a neutral process and tracking clones (groups of cells with common ancestry). At each time
interval we calculate the contribution to ΛCCn for all clones in the system, treating each lineage
as a group of n cooperators in a population of defectors. See Figure 4 for a plot of ΛCCn with
N = 100.
We use the equation for cooperator fixation probability derived in [48] for a well-mixed
population
ρC =
[
1 +
N−1∑
m=1
m∏
n=1
γn
]
(17)
with γn = T−n /T+n . In that case the transition probabilities and thus γn are defined exactly for
each value of n. For the VT model we substitute in the mean transition probabilities given by
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Figure 4: We calculate ΛCCn for N = 100 by running simulations of the VT model and tracking
clones. In each simulation we look at snapshots in time give us a potential ‘state’ from which to
find the total number of degree-weighted cooperator-cooperator interactions for different clone
sizes. This is then normalised and ΛCCn is calculated by taking the mean over at least 5000
values. Error bars show standard deviation.
Equations (12), (13) and (14), to obtain
ρC ≈ 1
N
+
δ
N
{
−c(N − 1)
2
+ b
N−1∑
m=1
m∑
n=1
(
ΛCCn − n/N
N − n
)}
+O(δ2) (18)
for the fixation probability in the weak selection limit. The critical benefit-to-cost ratio is then
obtained by setting ρC = 1/N giving
(
b
c
)∗
≈ N − 1
2
[
N−1∑
m=1
m∑
n=1
(
ΛCCn − n/N
N − n
)]−1
. (19)
Figure 5 compares Equation (18) with simulation results for the VT model. It shows there
is a reasonable fit between our approximation of fixation probabilities with the simulation data
in the region 2.0 < b < 3.5, where we have once again set c = 1. These values are close to
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio and therefore represent the region in which we would expect
the weak selection limit to hold, thus this equation for fixation probabilities is a reasonable
approximation. The critical benefit-to-cost ratios calculated from simulation and Equation (19)
are given in Table 1. For both we get a value of b/c = 2.8 correct to one decimal place. This
is significantly less than the critical benefit-to-cost ratios calculated for the EGT model with
death-birth update. In the next section we will look further at comparing these models and
attempt to identify the mechanism by which cooperation is promoted in the VT model.
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Figure 5: An approximation for fixation probabilities in the VT model is given by Equation (18)
and plotted here (solid line) for δ = 0.025, c = 1 and N = 100. Comparison with simulation
results (points) shows that the approximation is good near the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (i.e.
where ρC = ρ0 = 1/N), but breaks down outside the region 2 < b < 3.5. This is consistent with
the fact that the equation is derived in the weak selection limit, and suggests that it can be used
to calculate the critical ratio.
4 Comparing the models
Figure 6 shows the results of these simulations along with the theoretical EGT results for the HL
graph with death-birth update and the critical benefit-to-cost ratios are summarised in Table 1.
It is clear that cooperators are much more successful in the VT model, in particular the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio for the VT model is less than half that for EGT with death-birth update.
The question then arises as to what mechanism is causing this amplifying effect in the VT model,
the two obvious candidates being the effect of cell motility and the decoupling of birth and death.
One way to test whether cell motility is enhancing the evolutionary success of cooperation is to
introduce an analogue into the EGT model whereby we allow cells to swap sites with their
neighbours. At each timestep a swap occurs with probability m. When this happens a cell is
chosen uniformly at random to switch places with one of its neighbours. Note that this process is
independent of cell fitness. The parameter m is therefore a measure of the strength of migration
and by setting m = 0 we regain the original EGT model. Figure 7 plots fixation probability
against benefit-to-cost ratio for a range of m values and demonstrates that increasing migration
within this framework actually decreases the evolutionary success of cooperation. It therefore
seems unlikely that the ability of cells to move past each other in the VT model is the reason for
enhanced cooperative success.
In order to determine whether the spatial decoupling of birth and death promotes cooperation
we consider the VT model with a death-birth update rule. To implement this we follow the
simulation algorithm as defined in Section 3, the only change being in choosing which cells
reproduce and die when an update event occurs. First a cell is chosen for extrusion uniformly
11
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Figure 6: Fixation probabilities for the prisoner’s dilemma game in the VT model with c = 1
and δ = 0.025. Points show simulation results for a decoupled update rule (blue, circles) and a
death-birth update rule (red, diamonds). For the decoupled update rule the approximate fixation
probabilities given by Equation (18) are plotted (blue, solid line) and for the death-birth update
we plot a best fit line (red, dashed line). Fixation probabilities, given by Equation (5), for an HL
with death-birth update in the EGT model (green, solid line) are also shown for comparison. The
grey dotted line shows the fixation probability for a neutral mutant. It is clear that cooperation
is significantly favoured in the VT model with decoupled update rule when compared with the
EGT results, in particular the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is more than halved. However when
a death-birth update is introduced on the VT model this effect is suppressed and the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio is very close to the EGT case.
at random. Fitnesses are then calculated for the neighbouring cells and one of these is chosen to
divide with probability proportional to fitness. This process is shown schematically in Figure 8.
It can be seen clearly in Figure 6 that changing the update rule in this way suppresses the
evolutionary success of cooperation in comparison to the decoupled update rule. Indeed in this
case we obtain b/c = 7.3 which is greater than for the EGT model with death-birth update.
Combining these two results we conclude that it is the spatial decoupling of birth and death
which leads to the amplification of cooperative success in the VTmodel. Indeed this is an intuitive
result and is consistent with results from the shift dynamics models [33, 34]. A cooperative
strategy is only beneficial if cells are able to form a cluster of cooperators. If birth and death are
constrained to occur next to each other, as is the case for death-birth and birth-death update
rules, then the cluster can only grow at the boundary. If a cell were to reproduce inside a
cooperative cluster it would result in the death of a neighbouring cooperator, leaving the size
of the cooperator population unchanged. For the decoupled birth and death update in the VT
model this is not the case. If a cooperator inside the cluster reproduces it will lead to an increase
in the size of the cooperator population with probability 1 − n/N , where n is the number of
cooperators and N the total number of cells. The fact that migration appears to suppress the
success of cooperation could also provide an explanation as to why, if a death-birth update is
12
2 4 6 8 10
Benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Fi
xa
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
, 
C
 (%
)
m = 0.0
m = 0.1
m = 0.2
m = 0.5
m = 1.0
Figure 7: Fixation probabilities for an EGT model with migration on an HL, with c = 1 and
δ = 0.025, are obtained through simulation. The parameterm is the probability that a migration
event will occur in each timestep. If such an event occurs two neighbouring cells are randomly
selected to swap vertices. Increasing m leads to decreased cooperative success. The case m = 0
corresponds to our original EGT model with no migration.
enforced in both cases, cooperators fare better in the EGT model than in the VT model.
5 Conclusions
Evolutionary graph theory has become the accepted framework for modelling the evolution of
cooperation on structured populations, ranging from complex social networks to collective cellular
behaviour organised in tissues. While it may be an appropriate tool for the former, we have
demonstrated that a static graph model is not sufficient to capture the dynamic behaviour of an
epithelium.
We have shown using the theory developed by Allen et al. [31] and simulations that for a
Figure 8: Death-birth update rule in the Voronoi tessellation model. When an update event oc-
curs a cell is chosen to die uniformly at random from the population (red). From the neighbour-
hood of the dead cell (yellow) a mother cell (blue) is then chosen with probability proportional
to fitness. The mother cell divides and the dead cell is removed from the tissue.
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prisoner’s dilemma on an epithelium-like structure in EGT, cooperation is successful if b/c > 6.7
for a death-birth update, where we have used an averaged payoff. This inequality holds when
we model the epithelium as an HL as well as a DT, suggesting that there is a marginal effect
on fixation probabilities due to heterogeneity of neighbour number. However, the choice of an
averaged payoff could be suppressing the effect of heterogeneity compared to an accumulated
payoff, as it does for scale-free networks [49, 50]. It would be advisable therefore to compare
fixation probabilities on the two structures for an accumulated payoff, although we do not expect
a substantial difference. Vertex degree in scale-free networks follow a polynomial distribution
and therefore exhibit large variance, whereas degree variance in DTs is comparatively small.
For a birth-death update on the other hand, cooperation is not successful for any benefit-to-
cost ratio under a prisoner’s dilemma game. The fact that the dynamics is so sensitive to the
choice of update rule is troubling and neither update rule is a realistic representation of birth and
death on an epithelium. For the VT model we are able to spatially decouple birth and death.
We showed, using simulation and approximate theoretical results, that using a decoupled update
rule in the VT model promotes cooperation compared to the EGT examples. Furthermore when
the VT model was run with a death-birth update this effect was suppressed and cooperation
actually fared worse than in the EGT model, leading us to conclude that the decoupling of birth
and death is the main mechanism for increased success of cooperation in the VT model. This
is consistent with previous work looking at shift dynamics on a static graph which found that
decoupling birth and death led to increased cooperative success in one-dimension [33], and in
two-dimensions if a repulsive force was introduced between cells of different types [34]. The fact
that cells can move and change neighbours in the VT model however, does not appear to increase
the likelihood of cooperation fixating. Indeed we found that introducing migration into an EGT
model actually suppressed cooporation, and it is therefore possible that cell motility is acting to
reduce cooperative success in the VT model.
As it is the update rule which seems to influence the evolutionary success of cooperation most
substantively, the question arises as to which, if any, reflects the behaviour of a real epithelium.
Clearly it is unrealistic that when a death occurs it is immediately followed by a neighbour un-
dergoing division, or vice versa, as for the death-birth and birth-death update rules respectively.
However it is also not the case that birth and death events are completely spatially independent.
Cell extrusion can be induced in areas of overcrowding within a tissue, which could be caused
by high levels of proliferation. Similarly if local density is low, e.g. due to a high instance of
cell death, cells can be induced to reproduce [51, 52]. It is difficult to see how this more subtle
link between birth and death could be implemented in an EGT model, however the VT model
could be extended to include density-dependence for division and/or extrusion. Furthermore
a density-dependent model would allow us to maintain an (almost) constant population size
without enforcing that birth and death occur simultaneously, another unrealistic assumption.
In our discussion of whether cooperation is succesful on an epithelium we have limited our-
selves to the additive prisoner’s dilemma game, whereas evolutionary game theory models of
cancer have used a variety of social dilemma games. Extending our analysis to a general two-
strategy game should be relatively straightforward, indeed we can use the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio to calculate the structure coefficient and derive a general condition for evolutionary success
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for a two-player, two-strategy game [53]. However it has been argued that multiplayer public
goods games are more realistic for cancer modelling, and can lead to very different results. Recent
work has considered the dynamics of these types of games on lattices [14] and DT graphs [17] in
an EGT framework, it would therefore be an interesting comparison, but non-trivial extension,
to consider them on the VT model.
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